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I. INTRODUCTION: THE ROLE OF THE LOUISIANA JUDGE
In commemoration of Louisiana's fusion of legal cultures, I will
discuss briefly how the integration of those cultures shapes, affects,
and challenges Louisiana courts. As might have been predicted,
given Louisiana's Spanish and French heritage and its national union
with Anglo-American sister states, Louisiana became a mixed
jurisdiction, which has received basic characteristics from both civil
and common law.
With the transfer of sovereignty over the Louisiana territory by
France to the United States two hundred years ago, the United States
Constitution and federal laws became automatically supreme,
bringing with them admiralty, bankruptcy, copyright, patent, and
other federal statutes.' But through two statutes in 1803 and 1804,
Congress expressly retained the existing French and Spanish laws in
all other areas, with the exception of introducing the writ of habeas
corpus and trial by jury.2 By preserving some aspects of Louisiana's
civilian heritage, while introducing some common law concepts, the
federal government left the new territory the complex challenge of
integrating its French and Spanish legal origins into a union whose
legal roots were firmly based in English common law.
At first it appeared Louisiana would simply convert to a common
law system, for in 1805, the Legislative Council of the Territory of
Orleans (which comprised the present State of Louisiana) enacted a
system of written pleading similar to the common law of New York
and a general criminal statute in conformity with the common law of
England. 3 But the French-speaking and French-trained lawyers,
especially in the city of New Orleans, resisted efforts by the
Territorial Governor, W. C. C. Claiborne, and the common-law
trained immigrants, to implant further substantive or procedural
common law. In 1808, the Territorial Legislature adopted a Digest
Copyright 2004, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
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of the Civil Laws then in force, which was a compilation of laws
based on one of theprojets of the French Civil Code, as well as many
provisions of the Spanish law of Louisiana.5 Subsequently, the
Legislature approved the Civil Code of 1825, which was based in
large part on the French Civil Code, with adaptations derived from
the works ofPothier and Toullier, as well as Spanish legal principles.6
Finally, in 1870, a revised Civil Code was adopted, following
substantially the prior Code, but eliminating all articles relating to
slavery.7
Despite the adoption of the Civil Code that comprises the private
law, the influence of the common law increased in areas of the law
where civilian thought had not been legislatively established. A code
of commerce was prepared but the project was rejected by the
Legislature.8 Instead, the problems of trade between Louisiana and
other states were resolved jurisprudentially under the common law
standards of mercantile law and by the adoption of various Uniform
Acts.9 Although the merchant community at first opposed the
reception of the law merchant of the United States, eventually they
were won over by the economic benefits of conforming to nationwide
commercial usages.l°
Moreover, the Digest and Codes have each empowered judges to
fill gaps in the Code, thereby recognizing that the Code is not a
complete legal instrument." The Digest, in its Article 21, declared:
In civil matters, where there is no express law, the judge is bound to
proceed and decide according to equity. To decide equitably an
appeal is to be made to natural law and reason, or received usages,
where positive law is silent. 12The substance of Article 21 was retained
in each of the Civil Codes including the present revised Code.
Perhaps because of this provision, the Louisiana courts early on
developed the practice of borrowing judicial solutions from the
common law, especially in the area of torts, as well as the custom of
citing and relying on judicial precedents.' 3
5. Id. at 588-89.
6. Id. at 589.
7. Id. at 590; A. N. Yiannopoulos, Requiem for a Civil Code: A
Commemorative Essay (Oct. 2002) (manuscript on file with author).
8. Vernon V. Palmer & Matthew Sheynes, Louisiana, in Mixed Jurisdictions
Worldwide: The Third Legal Family 257, 293-94 (Vernon V. Palmer ed., 2001).
9. Id. at 294-95.
10. Id. at 299.
11. Symeon C. Symeonides, The Louisiana Judge: Judge, Statesman,
Politician, in Louisiana: Microcosm of a Mixed Jurisdiction 89, 93 (Vernon V.
Palmer ed., 1999).
12. Digest of the Civil Laws Now in Force in the Territory of Orleans, Art. 21(1808).
13. See Ireland, supra note 1, at 591, 594.
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Nevertheless, our Civil Code endures and generally governs the
all important area of Louisiana's private law, including the law of
persons, family, property, successions, obligations, offenses and
quasi-offenses, matrimonial regimes, leases, sales, privileges,
mortgages, and prescription. 4 The 1870 Civil Code has now been
revised with the hope that it will be an authoritative statement of the
civilian tradition of the state within the scheme of a modem,
scientific, comprehensive organization. Thus the tradition of
codified laws is firmly established in Louisiana. I
Because of this mixed legal heritage, the role of judges in
Louisiana is unique, different from both their civilian and common
law counterparts. Dean and Professor Symeonides, in speaking on
how Louisiana judges have interacted with their mixed legal system,
observed:From day one, the Louisiana judge was expected to
undertake, and in any event asserted, a much more active role in the
shaping of the law and a much more prominent role in the state's
governance than his French counterpart. This was particularly true
during the formative years of the Louisiana legal system and remains
largely true today. 6In most respects, its judges behave and look like
common law judges, but when they decide cases under the Louisiana
Civil Code they are expected to adhere to the discipline of civil law
jurists. In some respects, even when they consider cases outside the
Code, they are still influenced by civil law traditions.
Due to their cross-training, Louisiana judges are knowledgeable
in both civil and common law and are capable of operating with ease
in both systems. 7 There is a learning curve in this judicial
switch-hitting program, however, that can throw ajudge off in writing
or interpreting an appellate opinion. Although they understand well
how precedents, ratio decidendi, and holdings work in the common
law, Louisianajudges, despite considerable effort over the years, still
do not seem to understand fully whether or how their common law
style opinions should be treated in later cases to be decided under the
14. Id. at 595-96.
15. As Professor Yiannopoulos has said:
Louisiana has been, and most probably will continue to be, a mixed
jurisdiction. This is a blessing rather than a handicap, because Louisiana
has a choice in the course of her future legal development and in the
pursuit of justice for all her citizens. Not necessarily at the expense of
certainty, Louisiana has always enjoyed, and will continue to enjoy,
flexibility in the administration of civil justice.
Yiannopoulos, supra note 7, at 17-18.
16. Symeonides, supra note 11, at 89.
17. Jean-Louis Baudouin, The Impact of the Common Law on the Civilian
Systems of Louisiana and Quebec, in The Role of Judicial Decisions and Doctrine
in Civil Law and in Mixed Jurisdictions 3 (Joseph Dainow ed., 1974).
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Civil Code. 8 Jurists agree that jurisprudence must have a different
role and impact on the civil and common law sides of our legal
system. But there has not yet been sufficient articulation and
agreement upon a theory or methodology that a judge should use to
determine how influential a previously decided case ought to be in
deciding a subsequent case under the Civil Code.
I have previously attempted to outline a theory of how the
decisions of our appellate courts that interpret and apply the Civil
Code should be used in subsequent civil law cases. 9 The basic idea
is that a previously decided case under the Civil Code, even though
contained in a common-law type opinion, means something
different than the case would in a common law system because
under civil law methodology, the Civil Code, notjudicial precedent,
is the primary source of law.
In the common law, judicial precedent plays a leading role and
serves as both a source of law and an example of a prior judge's
methodology in reasoning from the case-law materials.2 ° It is "a
process ... in which a proposition descriptive of the first case is
made into a rule of law and then applied to a similar situation."'"
Under the common law theory of precedent, courts in the
controversy before it have much flexibility in deciding which
previous case is sufficiently similar to be chosen as a precedent and
in formulating a rule based upon the material facts of the precedent
case. Paradoxically, however, in some common law systems,
especially the federal court system, a case interpreting a statute
enjoys a super-strong stare decisis effect or presumption of
correctness and will be reexamined and overruled only under the
most compelling circumstances.22
But under civil law methodology, judicial precedent plays only
a supporting role. The Civil Code is the primary source of law, and
precedent is only an example of a prior judge's interpretation and
18. Id. at 10.
19. See generally James L. Dennis, Interpretation andApplication ofthe Civil
Code and the Evaluation of Judicial Precedent, 54 La. L. Rev. 1 (1993).
20. Id. at 3. William Eskridge states that common law courts in the United
States consider stare decisis "more a rule of thumb than an iron-fisted command,"
at least in the area of common law and constitutional precedents. William N.
Eskridge, Jr., Overruling Statutory Precedents, 76 Geo. L.J. 1361, 1361 (1988).
21. Edward H. Levi, An Introduction to Legal Reasoning 1 (1951).
22. Eskridge, supra note 20, at 1362-63. Eskridge argues that while the
Supreme Court retains this super-strong presumption of correctness for statutory
precedents, it has departed from the strict stare decisis rule where the previous
opinion did not consider the issue thoroughly, where Congress left statutory
development to the courts, or where precedent has not created a great deal of public
and private reliance. Id. at 1368.
1006 [Vol. 63
JAMES L. DENNIS
application of legislated law.23 For a case based on the Civil Code
to serve as a good example or precedent it must illustrate that the
judge followed sound civil law methodology when he or she
interpreted the Code and applied it to the case. Thus, a subsequent
court is free to evaluate the precedent and give it more or less
persuasive value according to the quality of the prior court's
performance within the context of the Civil Code.
Given our hybrid legal system, Louisiana judges must always be
alert to whether, in a particular case, they are operating as civil or
common law jurists. A judge who mistakenly treats a Civil Code
case like a common law precedent by extracting a ratione decidendi
from its material facts, or by distinguishing or drawing an analogy
from such a ratione, probably will seriously misuse the Code
provisions that should govern the case. If a judge blindly follows
a previous civil law interpretation without analyzing its application
of the Code, the judge may perpetuate errors damaging to the civil
law system. Even if the facts of the prior case are identical to the
present case, the judge must still ascertain whether the decision was
properly supported by the applicable Code provisions before
following it. By the same token, civil law opinion writers should
take care to show clearly their interpretation and application of the
code provisions upon which their decisions are based.
Fortunately, Louisiana judges have available to them excellent
doctrinal writings in many areas of the Civil Code to help prevent
such errors. Woefully, however, they do not have enough to keep
them from going astray in uncharted civil law regions. Because the
vast majority of our judges are not bilingual, they cannot readily
access untranslated foreign civil law materials.24
On the common law side of Louisiana's hybrid system, I cannot
think of any particular difficulty ourjudges have had. Perhaps some
common law scholars would argue that because of our civil law
influence we do not adhere to precedent sufficiently, or that, in
statutory cases, unlike some common law judges, we do not treat a
statutory precedent as becoming part of the statute, but tend to
reexamine the legislation anew in each case. However, I think the
Louisiana trial and intermediate appellate courts do consistently
follow state Supreme Court precedent, not because of any formal
notion of stare decisis, but out of respect for each court's role in the
system." Of course, the Louisiana Supreme Court has at timesoverruled previous decisions as erroneous interpretations of the
23. See Dennis, supra note 19, at 3 & n.7.
24. Palmer & Sheynes, supra note 8, at 322-26.
25. See also id. at 284-85 (discussing reluctance of lower courts in Louisiana
to depart from decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court even though not formally
bound by stare decisis).
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Civil Code, which is what the court should do once it realizes that
its previous jurisprudence is inconsistent with correct interpretation
of the legislated law.2 6
II. CIVIL LAW AND THE FEDERAL COURTS: AN OVERVIEW
Federal judges must follow state law, including the Louisiana
Civil Code, because "the substantive law to be applied by the federal
courts in any case is state law, except when the matter before the
court is governed by the United States Constitution, an act of
Congress, a treaty, international law, the domestic law of another
country, or, in special circumstances, federal common law."' The
reason is both statutory and constitutional. Section 34 of the
Judiciary Act of 1789 provides that:The laws of the several states,
except where the Constitution, treaties [or statutes of the United
States] shall otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules
of decision in [trials at common law] in the courts of the United
States in cases where they apply.2"ln 1938, the Supreme Court
decided Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,29 which added a
constitutional component to the statutory command of the Judiciary
Act. Because the courts can have no greater law-making authority
than Congress, and Congress's law-making authority is constrained
by the enumerated powers of Article I, the structure of the
Constitution and separation of powers limits the ability of federal
courts to create federal common law. Rather, state law must provide
the rules of decision except where there is a federal interest requiring
application of federal law.30 This is commonly, although loosely,
known as the "Erie doctrine." 3'
Under the Erie doctrine state law is applied most often and
pervasively when the opposing litigants are of diverse citizenship.
But the Erie doctrine does not apply only in diversity cases. Thus,
state law has been applied to determine the character of property for
federal estate tax purposes, in pendent, now supplemental,
jurisdiction cases, in federal condemnation actions to determine what
property interests are compensable, and in a federal bankruptcy action
to determine the debtor's property rights, to name just a few issues
governed by state law.32
26. Id. at 284.
27. 19 Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure: Jurisdiction
§ 4501, at 2 (2d ed. 1996).
28. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1994).
29. 304 U.S. 64, 54 S. Ct. 817 (1938).
30. 19 Wright et al., supra note 27, § 4520, at 636.
31. Id. § 4501, at 2.
32. Id. § 4520, at 639-40.
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Because of the methodology required of federal judges in
determining state law, even civil law trained federal judges are apt to
have greater difficulty than a Louisiana state judge in conscientiously
interpreting and applying the Louisiana Civil Code. The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit ("Fifth Circuit") has said that
"[i]n order to determine state law, federal courts look to final decisions
of the highest court of the state[, and w]hen there is no ruling by the
state's highest court, it is the duty of the federal court to determine as
best it can, what the highest court of the state would decide."'33
Generally, in determining what a state's highest court would hold with
respect to a particular issue, federal courts of appeals "may consider
relevant state precedent, analogous decisions, considered dicta,
scholarly works and any other reliable data." Although this approach
does not prohibit reasoning directly from the Code and using scholarly
works, in practice federal judges rely far more heavily upon what they
consider to be relevant and analogous state court precedents. The use
of common law methodology is made more prevalent because federal
courts of appeals hearing appeals from Louisiana federal district courts
use three-judge hearing panels and their dockets are assigned randomly.
Many panels have no Louisiana judges, and most have no more than
one. As a result, common-law trained judges participate or
preponderate in civil code cases.35
Even for the federal judge inclined to use civilian methodology in
federal courts, it is a difficult road to tread, because the panel usually
will receive little help from the advocates. Our distinguished late
colleague Alvin Rubin once wrote that in his twenty-one years on the
federal bench he never saw one brief refer to the difference between
jurisprudence constante and stare decisis, or even one different in
approach or style from that used in common law cases. 6 Indeed, in my
experience on the Louisiana Supreme Court I found that briefs on Civil
Code issues in state court suffer from the same deficiencies, perhaps
due to the prevalence of common law techniques in legal education and
the ease with which reporters and research systems make analogous
cases available to lawyers. When the judges using those briefs are
common law trained and not particularly familiar with civilian
methodology, as often is the case on the Fifth Circuit, the lack of
argument by the attorneys based on civil law techniques may be fatal
to the use of civilian analysis by the court.
33. Hollis v. Hill, 232 F.3d 460,465 (5th Cir. 2000) (quoting Transcon. Gas
Pipeline Corp. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 953 F.2d 985,988 (5th Cir. 1992)).
34. Id. (quoting McCallum v. Rosen's Diversified Inc., 153 F.3d 701,703 (8th
Cir. 1998)).
35. Alvin B. Rubin, Hazards of a Civilian Venturer in Federal Court: Travel
and Travail on the Erie Railroad, 48 La. L. Rev. 1369, 1379 (1988).
36. Id. at 1377-78.
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I have time to describe only two examples, out of many, in which
the differences between the Louisiana mixed system and the federal
common law system created difficulties for federal judges applying
Louisiana law. They show some of the pitfalls facing a federal judge
attempting to ascertain the meaning of Louisiana law.
lII. INTERPRETIVE LEGISLATION
In the first example, In re Orso," two Louisiana law concepts
were sources of the federal court's difficulty in interpreting state law.
As you may know, the Louisiana Supreme Court has long recognized
as part of its civil law tradition that the legislature can enact
interpretive legislation.3" That court has explained that "interpretive
legislation does not create new rules, but merely establishes the
meaning that the interpreted statute had from the time of its
enactment. It is the original statute, not the interpretive one, that
establishes rights and duties."39 The law of Louisiana also establishes
an exemption from seizure by creditors for the proceeds and benefits
of annuity contracts. 40 Federal bankruptcy law authorizes persons
who take bankruptcy in Louisiana to make use of that state law
exemption in bankruptcy.4'
Paul William Orso suffered serious injuries in an automobile
accident which rendered him mentally retarded.42 Suit was filed on
his behalf and, ultimately, a structured tort settlement was entered
under which the defendants purchased annuities that would pay Orso
certain sums monthly for his lifetime.43 After several years during
which Orso demonstrated his inability to handle his affairs and timely
pay his debts, his mother had him interdicted and, acting as his
curatrix, filed for bankruptcy in his behalf.44 A claim was made for
him under the bankruptcy code and Louisiana law to exempt his
annuity benefits from his creditors' claims in bankruptcy. 45 The
37. 214 F.3d 637 (5th Cir. 2000) (Orso 1).
38. Ardoin v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1338 (La.
1978).
39. Id. at 1338-39.
40. La. R.S. 22:647(B) (2001) ("The lawful beneficiary... or payee... of an
annuity contract... shall be entitled to the proceeds and avails of the contract
against the creditors and representatives of the annuitant... and such proceeds and
avails shall also be exempt from all liability for any debt of such beneficiary, payee
... existing at the time the proceeds or avails are made available for his own use.
41. 11 U.S.C. § 522(d) (1994).
42. See In re Orso (Orso I1), 283 F.3d 686, 689 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
43. Id. at 689-90.
44. Id. at 690.
45. Id.
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Trustee in bankruptcy did not oppose the exemption but an
objection was filed by Orso's principal creditor, his former wife,
whom he owed a substantial amount in accrued alimony.46 The
bankruptcy court upheld the exemption and the district court
affirmned. 47
After the filing of Orso's bankruptcy petition, but before the
federal court of appeals heard the creditors' appeal, the Louisiana
Legislature, in an act that it expressly characterized as interpretive,
provided that an "annuity contract" includes any contract that states
on its face or anywhere within its terms that it is an annuity.4" This
legislative act was significant because much earlier, in 1987, in
Young v. Adler,49 the Fifth Circuit had held that a structured
settlement entered by an attorney for the payment of his fees was
not an annuity under Louisiana law for which he could claim an
exemption. Thus, the Louisiana legislature essentially told the Fifth
Circuit that its interpretation of the annuity statute was wrong.
In the appeal in Orso's case, the majority of the three-judge
panel either misunderstood or refused to recognize the power of the
Louisiana legislature to enact interpretive legislation, although the
matter had been well-settled by numerous Fifth Circuit and
Louisiana Supreme Court cases. Treating the interpretive act as
merely a new law having retroactive effect, the majority held that
federal law required it to apply the state law in effect at the time the
debtor filed his petition.51 The panel majority drew an analogy from
a previous case in which the Fifth Circuit refused to allow a
retroactive amendment to the Texas exemption list labeled
retroactive to govern a bankruptcy petition filed prior to the date of
the amendment.12 The majority concluded that the Louisiana
interpretative act had no effect, and that according to strict stare
decisis the case was governed by the prior decision in Young v.
Adler.53 Therefore, the district court's decision was reversed and
remanded with instructions to include Orso's annuities in the
property of his estate.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. 1999 La. Acts No. 63.
49. 806 F.2d 1303 (5th Cir. 1987).
50. See Pierce v. Hobart Corp., 939 F.2d 1305, 1308-09 (5th Cir. 1991)
(quoting Winstead v. Ed's Live Catfish & Seafood, 554 So. 2d 1237, 1242 (La.
App. 1989)); Harrison v. Otis Elevator Co., 935 F.2d 714, 719 (5th Cir. 1991);
Louisiana World Exposition v. Fed. Ins. Co., 858 F.2d 233, 244-45 (5th Cir. 1988);
Laubie v. Sonesta Int'l Hotel Corp., 752 F.2d 165, 167-68 (5th Cir. 1985); Ardoin
v. Hartford Accident and Indem. Co., 360 So. 2d 1331, 1338 (La. 1978).
51. Orso I, 214 F.3d 637, 639-40(5th Cir. 2000).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 641 n.5.
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However, a majority of the judges in active service of the Fifth
Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc.5 4 Disagreeing with the
panel, the en banc court affirmed the bankruptcy and district courts'
conclusion that the annuity payments were exempt from seizure for
two reasons: Orso's annuity was exempt under the plain meaning of
the Louisiana law both before and after the interpretive amendment.55
Therefore, the court overruled Young v. Adler, finding it inconsistent
with the Louisiana statute.5 6 Moreover, the en banc court also ruled
that the panel majority had erred in not giving effect to the Louisiana
interpretative act; that act had not changed the law retroactively; it
had merely clarified what the exemption law had always meant.57
Disregarding the Act was akin to disregarding a Louisiana Sureme
Court opinion interpreting the annuity provision post-Young.
Orso points to a pitfall that a federal court may face in attempting
to "guess" at Louisiana law: as a common law court it may be
inclined to resolve open legal questions only by analogy to previous
decisions, in disregard of Louisiana legislation and the civil law
tradition. But where those decisions are from outside of Louisiana,
and rely on common law precepts, doing so will result in a decision
not predictive of the Louisiana Supreme Court's interpretation, and
therefore not true to Erie. The federal courts' interpretative journey
with the exemption law made this mistake twice, first, in Young, by
relying on a Pennsylvania case to override the unambiguous textual
command from the legislature that all annuities are exempt from
seizure by the debtor's creditors, and again, by the Orso panel
majority, in equating a Louisiana interpretative act with a Texas
substantive amendment that changed the law retroactively.
In fairness to the Fifth Circuit, however, other panels have been
faithful to the notion that a federal court applying Louisiana law
needs to use civilian methodology. For example, in Songbyrd v.
Bearsville Records, Inc., the panel explicitly stated that a federal
court making an Erie guess on Louisiana civil law determinations had
to view the Code as supreme, and opinions interpreting the Code as
mere persuasive authority unless and until those opinions reached the
level of/urisprudence constante.59 That panel went on to use the text
of the Code, Professor Yiannopoulos' civil law treatise, and a 50-
year-old Louisiana Supreme Court decision to reach an alternative
54. In re Orso, 242 F.3d 534 (5th Cir. 2001).
55. Orso II, 283 F.3d at 693. The en banc court can, of course, overrule circuit
precedent absent any further legislative expression, and this section of the opinion
is best understood as so doing.
56. Id. at 694.
57. Id. at 696.
58. Id.
59. 104 F.3d 773, 779 (5th Cir. 1997).
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interpretation of a Code article to that taken in some intermediate
state appellate decisions, noting that the position of the state appeals
courts had not arisen to the level of jurisprudence constante." To
make better Erie guesses, the sensitivity of the Songbyrd panel to
civilian methodology should be emulated by all other panels of the
Fifth Circuit.
Another pitfall, however, is that a federal court, with its strong
stare decisis principles, may be reluctant to disregard its own
predictive precedents absent a pronouncement from the highest state
court that its interpretation is wrong. This leaves little room for the
Louisiana legislature, civilian scholars, or even a preponderance of
intermediate state courts properly applying civilian methodology, to
correct a federal interpretation that is not true to the Code or statute.6'
In FDIC v. Abraham, a recent Fifth Circuit panel stated that once the
Fifth Circuit has "Erie guessed" as to the meaning of a Louisiana
Code article or statute, stare decisis means it will not change that
interpretation absent a decision by the Louisiana Supreme Court or
near unanimous decisions by the intermediate appellate courts that are
"clearly contrary" to circuit precedent.62 Applying this strict stare
decisis rule without first ensuring that the precedent is in line with
civilian methodology seems contrary both to Louisiana law and the
spirit of the Erie doctrine.
IV. FACTUAL FINDINGS V. RULES OF LAW
Another civil law inspired difference that creates problems for a
federal court seeking to determine the applicable Louisiana law is the
power of Louisiana appellate judges to find facts de novo from the
record when they believe the trial court's fact finding is manifestly
erroneous.63 This power, described by Professor Vernon Palmer as
a "vestige of the pre-purchase Civilian procedural system," has no
counterpart in a federal system, where appellate review of jury
findings of fact in particular is strictly limited by the Seventh
60. Id.
61. For a discussion on the limitations stare decisis places on a federal court's
attempt to Erie guess at state law, see Jed I. Bergman, Note, Putting Precedent in
its Place: Stare Decisis and Federal Predictions of State Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev.
969 (1996).
62. 137 F.3d 264, 269 (5th Cir. 1998) (quoting Pruitt v. Levi Strauss & Co.,
932 F.2d 458, 465 (5th Cir. 1991)).
63. This power stems from Louisiana Constitution article V, § 10(B):
"[A]ppellate jurisdiction of a court of appeal extends to law and facts." La. Const.
art. V, § 10. Louisiana courts have limited appellate de novo review of facts to
cases where the trial court's finding of fact is in manifest error or based on a
reversible error of law. Rosell v. ESCO, 549 So. 2d 840, 844 (La. 1989).
2003] 1013
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Amendment.' Not surprisingly then, some federal judges have
struggled in determining how to use state court appellate findings of
fact when applying Louisiana law.
The Fifth Circuit confronted this problem as far back as 1952 in
Wright v. Paramount-Richards Theatres.65 There the plaintiff
received a $16,000 jury verdict in a Louisiana slip-and-fall case in
federal court by diversityjurisdiction.' The district court granted the
defendant's judgment as a matter of law, citing a Louisiana state trial
court's decision involving an almost identical accident in the same
theater.67 A Fifth Circuit panel reversed, reinstating the jury verdict.68
That panel explained that a federal court in a jury trial case applying
Louisiana law is bound by state court legal determinations, but not by
state court findings of fact.69 As a mixed jurisdiction, Louisiana
allows its appellate judges, upon finding manifest error, to reweigh
facts found by the jury, but the Seventh Amendment prevents federal
judges from doing the same.70 Therefore, the panel explained, the
challenge for a federal court applying Louisiana law is to separate
state court interpretations of law, applicable in the federal courts, and
state court fact findings that cannot be used by a federal appellate
court to expand its constitutionally limited review ofjury verdicts.7
While this rule may seem straightforward, it is one that some
reputable lawyers recently appearing before the Fifth Circuit failed to
take into account. In Ellis v. Weasler Engineering, the plaintiff, a
farm worker, sued the manufacturer of a pecan harvester for injuries
suffered when his clothing got caught on the drive shaft between a
tractor and the harvester." Plaintiff received a substantial jury
verdict in the district court, and defendants appealed. At issue in the
case was whether there was sufficient evidence for ajury to find that
the plaintiff had been engaged in a reasonably anticipated use of the
product when his coat was caught by the whirling drive shaft as he
was inspecting the harvester for a malfunction.
Applying Wright in this instance should have been fairly easy. As
the Wright panel had recognized, a federal appellate court is not
bound by state court findings of fact, and its substitution of such
findings for those made by a jury transgresses the Seventh
64. Palmer & Sheynes, supra note 8, at 276.
65. 198 F.2d 303 (5th Cir. 1952).
66. Id. at 304.
67. Id. at 304-05.
68. Id. at 308.
69. Id. at 305-06.
70. Id.
71. Wright, 198 F.2d at 306.
72. 258 F.3d 326, 328 (5th Cir. 2001).
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Amendment. 3 Yet rather than arguing about whether the evidence
offered at trial was sufficient for a jury to find that the plaintiff had
been engaged in a reasonably anticipated use of the product, lawyers
for both sides argued by analogy to scores of Louisiana appellate
opinions containing factual findings that particular situations did or
did not amount to a reasonably anticipated use of the product. They
argued for and against judgment as a matter of law on the basis of
how similar or dissimilar the state court fact findings were to the facts
of the case at bar.
These arguments were not faithful to the role accorded appellate
review of facts in either system. As I noted above, while Louisiana
courts are empowered to review findings of fact de novo, this power
can be exercised only where the fact finder's determination was in
manifest error. As a consequence, even Louisiana courts recognize
that cases with identical facts can have different results given the
latitude to be afforded the trier of fact as arbiter of reasonableness and
witness credibility.74 But brought to the federal system, the attorneys'
arguments were even more egregious. A federal appellate judge is
not empowered to reverse a jury verdict simply because he would
have made a different finding of fact based on the evidence in front
of him, or even because he believes a Louisiana state judge or jury
would have reached a different result on those facts.
In the original opinion of Ellis v. Weasler Engineering, the court
explained in depth the error of arguments based on state court factual
findings to reverse the findings of a federal jury.75 We noted that
unlike rules of state law, which a federal court must apply in a
diversity case, state court findings of fact are not binding upon the
federal court.76 The reason is that such factual determinations are in
the province of the jury. After the opinion was issued, however, two
non-Louisiana panel members became confused as to the meaning of
the court's precedent in Wright v. Paramount Richards Theatres and,
without changing the result, withdrew their endorsement of the
original opinion's explanation and application of Wright and its
underlying principles.
I believe the two panel members' confusion reflects one difficulty
a federal court has in ascertaining and applying Louisiana law. The
mandate of Erie, which requires a federal court to act as the highest
state court would act, is harder to follow because the Louisiana
appellate opinions abound with factual findings and reviews of
73. Id. at 333.
74. Knighten v. An. Auto Ins. Co., 121 So. 2d 344, 349 (La. App. 1st Cir.
1960).
75. 258 F.3d at 334-37.
76. Ellis, 258 F.3d at 334-36.
77. Ellis v. Weasler Eng'g, Inc., 274 F.3d 881 (5th Cir. 2001) (per curiam).
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factual findings that must be carefully distinguished from rules of law
or decisions. A non-Louisiana federal judge, used to appellate
opinions containing less fact review and none de novo, can be easily
misled when reading a Louisiana opinion to believe that a finding of
fact in that opinion is a legal rule binding on subsequent Louisiana
courts. Such a reading is not only unfaithful to Louisiana
jurisprudence, which recognizes that different fact finders may
resolve factually identical disputes in different but reasonable ways,
but threatens to undermine parties' right to a federal jury trial and
findings as to factual issues.
V. CONCLUSION
This catalog of the problems facing state and federal judges
attempting to apply Louisiana law should not be taken as exhaustive
or a negative comment on our system. I agree with Professor
Symeonides that there is nothing wrong with Louisiana being a mixed
jurisdiction.7" In fact, I agree with my late great colleague Albert Tate
that Louisiana has a great system that judges should revere.79 But if
we judges and civil law scholars are concerned about federal judges,
as well as state judges, properly applying civil law methodology to
the cases before them, the onus may be on us to exert greater efforts
to educate judges on the civil law. One way of doing this would be
for the Society of Louisiana Civil Law Scholars to take the lead in
organizing courses for Louisiana judges on opinion writing using
civilian methodology.
Why focus onjudges when the failure to accurately apply civilian
methodology extends to lawyers generally? Well, as Judge Richard
Posner of the Seventh Circuit noted in a different context, lawyers
take their cues, good and bad, from judges.8 0 If lawyers' briefs are
pedestrian, it may be because judges' opinions are lacking. Judges
exhibiting a knowledge and interest in civil law methodology in their
opinions will encourage lawyers to attempt to use the same in their
briefs.
I do not think the task is hopeless. I am encouraged by the story
of Edward Livingston, the common law trained lawyer who became
convinced of the superiority of the civil law, and in time grew to be
the strongest proponent of the civilian system in the critical period
immediately following the Purchase.8' From Livingston, we know
78. Symeonides, supra note 11, at 89.
79. See Albert Tate, Jr., The Role of the Judge in Mixed Jurisdictions: The
Louisiana Experience, 20 Loy. L. Rev. 231, 231 (1974).
80. Richard A. Posner, Legal Writing Today, in The Scribes Journal of Legal
Writing 35 (Joseph Kimble ed., 2001).
81. Richard H. Kilbourne, Jr., A History ofthe Louisiana Civil Code 43 (1987).
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that common law trained lawyers and judges can become well-versed
and respectful of civil law tradition. Our concern now is to ensure
that they be given the knowledge and incentives necessary to do so.

